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THE LAW AND THE MONOPOLY OF WORDS
AS TRADE-MARKS
By WILLIAm G. MAcKAY*
It is to be understood that the term monopoly at the present time is
in popular use and is susceptible of various interpretations. From an economic
standpoint, the word means the exclusive control or possession of anything.
The subject of our inquiry is monopoly, but only in connection with a small
segment of the great field of human relations, that is, with respect to a certain
type of property called a trade-mark, and more particularly as it concerns
the use of words.
For a considerable period of time legal scholars had much difficulty in
trying to make up their minds whether or not a trade-mark was actually a
kind of property or was simply an identifying device, by reason of the use
of which, the public could recognize a product from a particular source.
There was a conflict of opinion as to whether or not a trade-mark should be
regarded primarily as property, to be protected as such on behalf of the
user or proprietor under well defined legal and equitable principles, or
should be regarded rather in the light of a public interest in freedom of
action and fair competition. In the last seventy-five years there has been a
tremendous development in the use and importance of trade-marks. The
property idea has become firmly intrenched.
We are, and should always be, entitled to a free use of our language.
Perhaps this may well be regarded as a fundamental or inalienable right.
This being so, all restrictions and limitations upon the free use of words,
no matter what the reason or purpose may be, should be weighed carefully
and scrutinized closely.
In the United States trade-mark rights are acquired by priority of
adoption and use. Since there is always a difference of opinion, depending
upon the circumstances in a given situation, as to what may or may not be
monopolized in a trade-mark sense, the problem with respect to appropriation
of a mark may be difficult. We must always take into consideration the
character of the term sought to be monopolized as a trade-mark for particular
goods or in a particular field of operation. We must have it in mind that a
mark may be completely arbitrary, a mark may be descriptive or geograph-
ical in meaning, or it may be the name of a family or a host of individuals.
The arbitrary marks we now call strong marks, and the others we refer
to as weak marks. Some of these so-called weak marks are entitled to broad
protection on the basis of secondary meaning in connection with a particular
product or service.
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THE MONOPOLY OF WORDS AS TRADE-MARKS
Rather than to make an attempt to discuss the question of monopoly of
words as trade-marks in the abstract, it would seem more profitable, or
should I say enlightening, to review briefly some of the many interesting,
and at times, provocative judicial pronouncements and decisions on the
subject.
In Majestic Manufacturing Company v. Majestic Electric Appliance Co.,
Inc., Judge Freed wrote as follows:
"It is sufficient to say that the decided cases have uniformly drawn a
sharp and well-defined distinction in the degree of protection awarded to the
adopters and users of trade marks or trade names. It is firmly established
on one hand, that the owner of a trade mark which is 'original,' 'arbitrary,'
'fanciful,' or a 'strong mark,' may exclude, or prevent anyone from the
use of that trade mark not only for the commodity he manufactures and
sells, but for a wide variety of products."
"... it is equally well recognized that trade marks or trade names
merely suggestive or descriptive in character, or those emphasizing the
superior quality of the goods sought to be distinguished by them, and
sometimes referred to as 'weak marks,' afford protection against their use in
the narrow and restricted field only to which they have been applied. Trade
marks such as 'Acme,' 'Anchor,' 'Champion,' 'Eureka,' 'Excelsior,' 'Ideal,'
'Jewel,' 'Liberty,' 'National,' 'Pride,' 'Premier,' 'Queen,' 'Royal,' 'Star,'
'Sunlight,' 'Triumph,' 'Victor' and the like are illustrative of this type of
marks as was pointed out in American Steel Foundries v. Robertson et al.,
269 U. S. 372." 1
The arbitrary or strong mark has always been given broad protection
by the courts, regardless of differences as to goods or even differences in the
marks involved. As to the matter of a difference in goods, we have as a typical
case Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co.' It was held that the owner
of a well known mark, AUNT JEMIMA'S with the picture of a laughing
Negress, for a self-rising flour was entitled to enjoin the use of AUNT
JEMIMA'S for a prepared pancake syrup. The difference in goods was a
matter of concern to the court, and Judge Ward commented as follows:
"This brings us to inquire what the law on the subject really is. We
find no case entirely like the present. ' 3
The court concluded here that the use of AUNT JEMIMA'S for pancake
syrup by the defendant was a trespass which equity would not permit, and
pointed out that there were many pertinent decisions in the English courts,
referring particularly to Eastman Company v. Kodak Cycle Co.,4 in which
Eastman brought suit to restrain the use of the word Kodak for bicycles and
other vehicles.
176 USPQ 525, 525 (1948).
2247 F. 407 (3d Cir. 1917).
8 Id. at 409.
' 15 Rep. Pat. Cas. 105.
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Mr. Justice Romer, in brief, had this to say:
"I think the defendant, Kodak Cycle Company, Ltd., ought to be
restrained from carrying on business under that name. Moreover, they ought
not to be permitted to sell cycles under the name KODAK CYCLES. It
would lead to confusion. It would lead to deception and would be injurious
to the plaintiff."5
The defendant was enjoined from making any use of KODAK as a trade-mark
or as a part of a trade name.
The word PEAKS is an arbitrary mark for candy. In Mason Au &
Magenheimer Confectionery Mfg. Co. v. Chumas,6 Judge Chatfield held
that the word PEAKS in the form of a design with the letters P and S
connected, was infringed by the use of the word ALPS with the letters A and S
connected, on a competing candy bar, similarly formed and wrapped. When
we have it in mind that there is no similarity in the words, this is an
interesting example of the extent to which a court may go in protecting a
word mark, if there is a copying of design and an imitation of the product.
Naturally, the question arises as to whether the court should have enjoined
all acts of unfair competition without restraining the use of the word ALPS
if shown in a different form. Speaking technically, it is obvious that the word
ALPS is not to be regarded as confusingly similar to the word PEAKS. The
court was concerned with the similarity of the ensembles, as such.
And in George W. Luft Co. v. Zande Cosmetic Co.,' Judge Swan and
his associates approved a decision of the trial court holding that the word
ZANDE is confusingly similar to the word TANGEE, saying:
"Also without merit is the claim that there is no confusing similarity
between the words ZANDE and TANGEE. The appellants stress the absence
of proof of actual confusion or deception or purchasers, but such proof is
unnecessary."
8
These decisions illustrate the attitude of the courts generally with respect
to the truly arbitrary mark.
What is the situation with respect to the geographical mark, which is
regarded ordinarily as being very weak? We find that when such marks
have been used extensively, the courts are apt to give them a broad protection.
It is interesting to observe that in American Waltham Watch Co. v. United
States Watch Co., the subject under consideration was the name WALTHAM,
and we find Justice Holmes reasoning as follows:
"Whatever might have been the doubts some years ago, we think that
now it is pretty well settled that the plaintiff, merely on the strength of
having been first in the field, may put later comers to the trouble of taking
5 Id. at 106.
6 275 F. 357 (E.D. N.Y. 1921).
142 F.2d 536 (2d Cir. 1944).
I1d. at 538.
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such reasonable precautions as are commercially practicable to prevent their
lawful names and advertisements from deceitfully diverting the plaintiff's
custom."
9
The extensive use of a mark of this character as applied to a particular
product has become an increasingly important factor in the disposition of
cases relating to the vital problem of adequate protection, and so, we find
that in Elgin Nat. Watch Co. v. Elgin Razor Corp., Judge Wilkerson enjoined
the use of ELGIN for electric razors, taking the position that in spite of the
character of the word ELGIN and the difference in goods, the use by the
defendant was unfair. Said he:
"The advertisement of a $15 ELGIN electric razor at prices ranging
from $2.95 to $5 may to some extent reflect on plaintiff's good will and
reputation. If the Elgin razors are in fact, as well as in price, cheap and of
inferior quality, and not precision built, plaintiff's good will and reputation
may be adversely affected."' 0
We find that in Canadian Club Corporation v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale,"
it appeared that there was a palming off of the beverages of the defendant
for the goods of the plaintiff, and that there was some similarity in the
design of the packages. This being so, Judge Wooley held that the mark
CANADIAN CLUB is confusingly similar to the mark CANADA DRY.
If we consider seriously the natural limitations on such a geographically
descriptive term as CANADA DRY, it may prove to be somewhat difficult
to follow the reasoning of the court with respect to the name CANADIAN
CLUB as a brand.
Family names have always presented a problem, simply because most
family names identify a rather large group of persons, and there has been
an understandable reluctance to sanction monopoly. However, the trend, as
in the case of geographical marks, is to give broad protection to a well
known family name brand. The case of L. E. aterman Co. v. Gordon,2
is typical. Here, the court considered it significant that WATERMAN was
not the family name of the defendant and brushed aside the difference
between fountain pens and razor blades. Judge Learned Hand spoke indig-
nantly as follows:
"There is indeed a limit; the goods on which the supposed infringer
puts the mark may be too remote from any that the owner would be likely
to make or sell. It would be hard for the seller of a steam shovel to find
ground for complaint in the use of his trade-mark on a lipstick. But no such
difficulty arises here; razor blades are sold very generally by others than
razor blade makers, and might well be added to the repertory of a pen
'173 Mass. 85, 87, 53 N.E. 141, 142 (1899).
1025 F. Supp. 886, 888 (N.D. II. 1938).
"60 F.2d 785 (3d Cir. 1932).
-72 F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1934).
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maker. Certainly, when the infringement is so wanton, there is no reason
to look nicely at the plaintiff's proofs in this regard."' 3
It will be noted that in Hat Corporation of America v. D. L. Davis
Corporation,4 the trade-mark involved was the well known name DOBBS
used for many years for hats. The court found that the name had actually
become an impersonal symbol entitled to broad protection and reasoned that
an individual by the name of William H. Dobbs should be precluded from
using his own name on hats, directly or indirectly, to the detriment of an
old established business.
In the recent case of Bulova Watch Company, Inc. v. Stolzberg,'5 the
court reasoned that the use of BULOVA on low-priced shoes would injure
the plaintiff's reputation and dilute the quality of his trade-mark, since
that mark, although not fanciful, had been used for watches and the like
for over fifty years, had been widely advertised, and was well known in
the trade.
In this country there has been a popular misconception to the effect
that a man has an absolute right to the use of his own name, but this is
incorrect, a more proper rule being that he may only use his own name
fairly.
Now, let us see what has been done with respect to ordinary run-of-
the-mill words in the language. In Alfocorn Milling Company v. Edgar-
Morgan Co., we find that the plaintiff had adopted HAPPY HEN, HAPPY
HOG, HAPPY COW, and HAPPY CHICK for feeds. Along came the
defendant, apparently the stubborn type, and adopted HAPPY MULE for
feed. The court said:
"We are of the opinion this word HAPPY is one of such nature as to
be incapable of such exclusive appropriation by anyone."
As an example of the opposite extreme, we have the startling conclusion
in Trimble v. Woodstock Mfg. Co., Inc., 6 Judge Hazel held that the mark
KUMFY KRIB is an infringement of the mark KIDDIE KOOP for cribs.
It may seem fantastic, but the court stated:
"KUMFY KRIB . .. in my opinion, is an imitation of plaintiff's arbi-
trary and fanciful designation, registered as a trade-mark .... ,,17
The pendulum swings again. In Pabst Brewing Co. v. Decatur Brewing
Co.,'" there was a vigorous controversy over the use oF the mark BLUE
RIBBON for malt extract. Pabst had used the mark for many years and it
had acquired a secondary meaning indicating Pabst Beer. Decatur had
"Id. at 273.
1,4 F. Supp. 613 (D. Conn. 1933).
r 72 USPQ 72 (1947).
"" 297 F. 524 (W.D. N.Y. 1923).
17 Id. at 528.
's 284 F. 110 (7th Cir. 1922).
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operated a brewery in Illinois, but after handling beer for Pabst until the
sale was prohibited, Decatur then began to sell a BLUE RIBBON BRAND
of malt extract and built up a considerable business. Subsequent to the
advent of prohibition, Pabst continued with the use of its famous BLUE
RIBBON mark for near beer.
Judge Alschuler and his associates on the appeal bench followed the
reasoning that the labels for malt extract indicated clearly that the product
was used for food purposes, that is, for baking, and minimized the plain,
hard fact with respect to the true use of the malt extract by the purchasing
public. So the court was able, with a straight face, to state:
"The term 'Blue Ribbon,' on the contrary, had long acquired special
significance, wholly apart from its use as a trade-name for any product.
The Century Dictionary says it is employed to indicate membership in total
abstinence organizations. Surely it was not this application which induced
its employment as a trade-name for beer. A further definition given is that
it signifies high merit, as indicating first prize for excellence at an exhibition
or contest. It is in this long and well understood sense that it has been so very
much used as a trade-name for articles of commerce. It was shown to have
been registered in the Patent Office over 60 times, some of the several
registrations being for whiskey, wine, vinegar, flavoring extracts, candy,
chewing gum, chocolate, flour, bread, cigars, chewing and smoking tobacco,
citrus fruits, fresh grapes, fresh deciduous fruits, and canned fruits. Such
registrations at different times and to different persons would indicate that
the Patent Office did not recognize a large measure of inclusiveness in the
name."919
It appears that the court turned its back on two important facts-
that BLUE RIBBON had acquired a secondary meaning as to beer-and
that regardless of the labeling, malt extract was used primarily to make
beer. How different the reasoning in Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Budweiser
Malt Products Corporation.2" The court restrained the use of BUDWEISER
for malt syrup, and Judge Rogers made this statement:
"This brings us to a consideration of the law applicable to the facts.
It has been suggested that the term 'Budweiser' is a geographical term, and
therefore not a technical trade-mark. If 'Budweis' and 'Budweiser' are so
nearly alike that the latter could properly have been called a geographical
term, a question which it is not necessary now to decide, it is clear that the
term 'Budweiser' is one which has acquired in this country a secondary
meaning. As was said by the court in Coca-Cola v. Koke Co., 254 U. S. 143, 41
Sup. Ct. 113, 65 L.Ed. 189, we may say in this case that: 'Whatever may
have been its original weakness, the mark for years has acquired a secondary
significance, and has indicated the plaintiff's product alone.' "21
Although "Life" is a common word in the language and has been
used as a trade-mark for many products, such as, cuff links, shirt studs,
19 Id. at 112.
20 295 F. 306 (2d Cir. 1923).
21 Id. at 309.
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fruits and vegetables, breakfast cereal, tooth paste, cosmetics, cattle feed,
and so on, we find that in Time v. Viobin Corporation,22 the publisher of a
magazine called LIFE sought to enjoin a mark consisting of the term LIFE
OF WHEAT shown in white letters on a red background, with the word
"Life" in larger type, for a cereal product sold in tins. Judge Lindley
considered many cases involving differences in goods and even noted the
words of Judge Hand in Yale Corp. v. Robertson, that such use may be an
injury "even though the borrower does not tarnish it, or divert any sales by its
use, for a reputation, like a face, is the symbol of its possessor and creator,
and another can use it only as a mark.""3 That is a colorful statement, and
may have some merit, particularly if the word "creator" has a part to play,
but this can hardly be said of an ordinary and common word in the language,
regardless of great effort on the part of the complainant. Said Lindley:
"Defendant's product is far removed from that of the Plaintiff. It is
not in the same class, possesses none of the same functions. It seems to me
there is no logical basis upon which it can be said that any member of the
public can reasonably infer that cereal food in tin cans labeled 'Life of
Wheat' is in any way sponsored by Plaintiff." 24
In Stanco, Inc. v. Mitchell, we find Judge McMillan speaking in this
vein:
"The evidence further shows that for several years defendants have
manufactured and sold insecticide in large containers under the name
'Mitchellite,' but only since 1936 have they marketed and sold insecticide in
small containers under the name 'Mit.' Defendants attempt to justify their
use of the word 'Mit' on the ground, among others, that said word consists
of the first three letters of their name and of the trade-name of their business.
I am not attempting to say or to hold that the name 'Mit' was adopted
purposely to obtain the benefit of the advertising and good will attaching to
the commodity 'Flit,' but whether it was or not, the fact remains that to a
certain extent it does. The suggestion that the word 'Mit' is available for
defendants' use because an abbreviation of their own name does not impress
me."
25
And he went on:
"I recognize and accept the rule of the federal courts that there is no
excuse for even an approximate simulation of a well-known trade-mark
applied to goods of the same descriptive properties, and when applied, as
here, to an identical commodity, I am of the opinion that such rule should
be rigidly enforced. Another salutary and well-settled rule that should be
applied here is that any reasonable doubt should be resolved against the
newcomer in the field. Therefore, the defendants, on entering upon the insecti-
cide business already occupied by plaintiff, owed the duty of distinctively
2 40 F. Supp. 249 (E.D. fI1. 1941).
22 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928).
24 See note 21 supra at 253.
2' 23 F. Supp. 205, 206 (W.D. Tex. 1937).
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naming their product so as to insure against confusion in the mind of the
purchasing public." 2
6
It is particularly interesting to note that in Wonder Mfg. Co. v. Block,
Judge Gilbert held that:
"The word 'Wonder' upon goods identical in appearance, insoles for
shoes, conveys the same idea as does the word 'Wizard' and its use is an
infringement.12 7
and in Block v. Jung Arch Brace Co.,2" the 6th Circuit refused to follow
such reasoning and held that WONDER and MIRACLE are not likely to be
confused with WIZARD. Said Judge Hickenlooper:
"Under the foregoing facts, the plaintiffs' right to relief, if any, depends
upon the right to appropriate, by registration (adoption) of trade-mark,
the exclusive right to use of all words implying supernatural origin, or
abnormal or magical source, and plaintiffs' argument goes to this extent.
Thus 'Wonder' is said to infringe the trade-mark 'Wizard' because a 'Wizard'
is a 'wonder worker'; 'Miracle' is said to infringe because it is 'a wonder.'
By like process of reasoning an infringement could be predicated upon the
use of the words 'conjurer,' 'magician,' 'sorcerer,' 'alchemist,' 'spiritualist,'
and many other words having no similarity in appearance or sound. This we
conceive to be inconsistent with both reason and precedent." 29
For a good, common sense discussion concerning the question of the
significance of the use of common words, we have the case of Quaker Oats
Co. v. General Mills, Inc. 0 Here we find that General Mills had adopted
the marks WHEATIES, KORNIES and MAIZIES for cereal products and,
of course, WHEATIES was applied to a wheat cereal and KORNIES and
MAIZIES were applied to a corn cereal food. Along came the Quaker
Oats Company with the mark OATIES for an oat cereal product. General
Mills objected and a vigorous contest ensued. Having in mind the scientific
approach to the problem of a likelihood of confusion in trade, it is enter-
taining to observe the words of Judge Minton:
"Both parties conducted surveys. The defendant, from its survey, sub-
poenaed some seventeen of the persons interviewed to testify in court and
to identify a questionnaire each had responded to on the survey. The sub-
stance of their testimony was that a representative defendant came to their
houses making a survey on ready-to-eat cereals, and asked each witness a
number of questions from a questionnaire which was filled out in the presence
of the witness and signed by the witness. The gist of the questionnaire and
of the testimony of these seventeen witnesses at the time was directed to the
answers the witnesses had made to Question 5 in the questionnaire. In making
the survey, Question 5 was propounded in two ways, 'Do you recall what
20 Id. at 206.
-249 F. 748, 749 (9th Cir. 1918).
"300 F. 308 (6th Cir. 1924).
"Id. at 309.
20 134 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1943).
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company makes "Oaties"?' or in the alternative, 'Here is an advertisement
of "Oaties." What company do you think makes it?' The response of these
seventeen witnesses was to the effect that the 'Wheaties' company made it.
At the time the question was asked, an advertisement of the plaintiff was
exhibited to the person being interviewed, and who later testified in court,
which advertisement fairely shrieked 'Quaker' at one who looked at it. The
dominating feature of the advertisement was the smiling coumtenance of a
Quaker as he exhibited in his hands the enlarged facsimile of a carton in
which 'Oaties' was then being marketed." 3'
After noting a common use of the diminutive suffix "ies" in the breakfast
cereal trade, the court held that OATIES is not likely to be confused with
WHEATIES or KORNIES or MAIZIES.
A review of these representative decisions and opinions leads inescap-
ably to the conclusion that there is a constant striving toward the desired
end that there be no unjustified interference with fair competition. It is
evidence also that trade-mark law is essentially judge-made law and that
there is great truth in the age-old admonition that every tub must rest on its
own bottom. It must be understood that legitimate business should be pro-
tected in the use of trade-marks against the evils of what we call poaching
and piracy and the palming off of one's good as the goods of another.
At the same time we must be conscious of the true significance of the use
of common words in the language, whether they be descriptive, geographical,
or family names, and actually, when one adopts as a trade-mark a word
falling in these categories, he should be charged as a matter of law, with
notice of all of the limitations and weaknesses inherent in such a word.
Although it is well understood that there is an overwhelming desire on the
part of business to adopt and use, for reasons fairly obvious, descriptive
and geographical terms and family names, it is a more sound business
practice to adopt an arbitrary type of trade-mark, distinctive in character,
and more readily susceptible of broader protection.
81Id. at 431.
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